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EXTENDING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO JUVENILES-
GAULT IN INDIANA
The effect of In re Gault' on the juvenile process in all jurisdictions
has been explored elsewhere in this Symposium. The amount and mode of
change in procedure necessitated by this decision will, of course, vary
according to the particular structure and characteristics of the juvenile
process in a specific jurisdiction. This Note will explore the impact of
Gault, both as a present statement of law and as a portent of decisions to
come, on the Indiana juvenile court system. Attention will be confined to
the adjudicative phase of Indiana's system, i.e., those parts of the process
in which the juvenile court and its staff are directly involved, as dis-
tinguished from those involving the police or the treatment institutions.2
THE INDIANA JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM
A brief exposition of the Indiana juvenile court system is necessary
to understand the impact of Gault on that system.3 Shortly after Cook
County, Illinois, pioneered the juvenile court concept in 1899,' Indiana
adopted its Juvenile Court Act of 1905' which followed the general
pattern emerging in other states. Following piecemeal amendment, the
Indiana legislature enacted more substantial amendatory legislation in
1941,6 dealing with procedural matters, and finally undertook a general
revision of the juvenile court system in 1945.' This 1945 Act, with
minor adjustments, constitutes the current statutory scheme.8 This scheme
can be broken down, for present purposes, into three classes of provisions
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. This narrowing of focus corresponds to the express limiting of the Gault
opinion to the judicial phase. 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). For a study revealing the practical
importance to the juvenile of the pre-adjudicatory phases of the process, see Note,
Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 775 (1966).
Since waiver proceedings are covered elsewhere in this Symposium, only brief
mention of them will be made here.
3. Judicial interpretation of statutory provisions is included in this section where
it does not directly relate to the Gault holdings or implications; where the inter-
pretation does so relate, it is included in the discussion of the specific issues, infra.
4. For an early history of the juvenile court movement, see H. Lou, JUVENILE
COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1927).
5. Ind. Acts 1905, chs. 45 § 1 and 145 § 1; Ind. Acts 1907, ch. 203, §§ 1, 2.
6. Ind. Acts 1941, ch. 233, §§ 1-34.
7. Im. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3101 to 3124 and 9-3201 to 3224 (Burns Supp. 1967).
The 1945 Act followed in many respects the 1943 Standard Juvenile Court Act drafted
by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. Companion legislation gave con-
current jurisdiction over the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor to
the courts of general jurisdiction. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-812-816. (Burns Supp. 1967).
S. Provisions prior to 1945 were finally repealed by Ind. Acts 1963, ch. 12, §§ 2,
10, 11, 14, 22-24.
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relating to the adjudicative process: court structure, jurisdiction, and
procedure.
Court Structure
In counties with a population greater than 250,000 (practically
speaking, all the substantial urban areas), a special juvenile court is
established with a separate, elected judge;9 in all other counties the
circuit court performs the duties of the juvenile court." In certain
counties the court exercising juvenile jurisdiction may appoint a referee
to hear juvenile cases, but the referee's findings must be approved by the
court."
Probation officers, their permissible number varying with the popula-
tion of the county, are appointed by and are directly responsible to the
juvenile judge. There are elaborate salary provisions.' A probation
officer's statutory duties include making investigations under the direction
of the judge, giving a written statement of probation conditions to a
juvenile placed on probation and keeping informed regarding him, and
helping to improve the conduct and condition of juveniles placed on
probation. Information obtained by the probation department is not
admissible as evidence, and is not to be disclosed outside the department
without authorization.'"
Jurisdiction
The juvenile court 4 has "original, exclusive jurisdiction" in cases
involving delinquent, dependent, and neglected children.' The definition
of delinquent children is at once broad, vague, and specific. With the
9. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3101 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
10. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3102 (Burns 1956 Repl.). Additionally, IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 9-3112 (Burns 1956 Repl.) gives concurrent juvenile jurisdiction to those few
superior courts which do not sit in the county seat and which are in counties with less
than 50,000 population.
11. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3116 (Burns Supp. 1967). A salary limit is fixed.
12. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3117 (Burns 1956 Repl.). In counties with less than
100,000 population, one chief probation officer and one additional officer for each
25,000 population is permitted; in all other counties with less than 250,000 population,
an adult probation officer is permitted as well; in counties with more than 250,000
population, any number is permitted.
13. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3119 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
14. No distinction 'is made between the special juvenile courts in the larger
counties and those in which the cricuit court judge exercises juvenile jurisdiction. See
text accompanying notes 9 and 10, supra. A post-Gault case, Hicks v. State, - mnd.
-, 230 N.E.2d 757 (1967), overruled language in Harris v. Souder, 233 Ind. 287,
119 N.E.2d 8 (1954), which indicated that such a distinction existed.
15. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3103 (Burns 1956 Repl.). The juvenile court's jurisdiction
over dependent and neglected children does not fall strictly within the scope of the
Gazdt case or this Note; however, since such children are subject in Indiana to the
same disposition as "delinquent" children, including commitment to a state institution,
Gault may indeed apply in cases of dependent and neglected children as well. For the
definition of dependent and neglected children, see IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3205, 3206
(Burns 1956 Repl.).
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general requirement that the child be under eighteen, 6 the definition
includes, e.g., those who commit crimes not punishable by death or life
imprisonment, who are incorrigible or ungovernable, who are habitually
truant, who violate the curfew, who "associate with immoral or vicious
persons," who are found in or about truck terminals, and who are
"guilty of indecent or immoral conduct."' 7
The provision for original, exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile
court is strengthened by another provision requiring other courts, unless
a "capital" or minor traffic offense is involved, to transfer a criminal
case, with its attendant papers, to the juvenile court whenever the
defendant is found to have been under eighteen at time of the alleged
crime."8 Conversely, the juvenile court is given the discretionary power,
16. "Under 18" means not having reached the eighteenth birthday. State ex reL
Neel v. Criminal Ct., 225 Ind. 23, 72 N.E.2d 357 (1947). According to dicta in Miller
v. Supt. of Boys' School, 209 Ind. 105, 198 N.E. 66 (1935), the time of the offense, not
the time of charging, determines jurisdiction.
17. INn. ANN. STAT. § 9-3204 (Burns Supp. 1967). The section reads: The words
"delinquent child" shall include any boy under the full age of eighteen (18) years and
any girl under the full age of eighteen (18) years who:
(1) Commits an act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime not pun-
ishable by death or life imprisonment;
(2) Is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the control
of his parent, guardian, or other custodian;
(3) Is habitually truant;
(4) Without just cause and without the consent of his parent, guardian, or other
custodian, repeatedly deserts his home or place of abode;
(5) Engages in an occupation which is in violation of law;
(6) Associates with immoral or vicious persons;
(7) Frequents a place the existence of which is in violation of the law;
(8) Is found begging, receiving or gathering alms, whether actually begging or
under the pretext of selling or offering anything for sale;
(9) Unaccompanied by parent, patronizes or visits any room wherein there is a
bar where intoxicating liquors are sold;
(10) Wanders about the streets of any city, or on or about any highway or any
public place between the hours of eleven o'clock p.m. and five o'clock a.m.
without being on any lawful business or occupation, except returning home
or to his place of abode after attending a religious or educational meeting or
social function sponsored by a church or school;
(11) Is found in or about railroad yards or tracks; or who jumps on or off trains;
or who enters a car or engine without lawful authority;
(12) Is found in or about truck terminals, including freight docks, garages, other
buildings incidental thereto or who enters a truck or trailer without lawful
authority;
(13) Uses vile, obscene, vulgar or indecent language;
(14) Uses intoxicating liquor as a beverage, or who uses opium, cocaine, morphine
or other similar drugs without the direction of a competent physician;
(15) Knowingly associates with thieves or other maliciously vicious persons;
(16) Is guilty of indecent or immoral conduct;
(17) Deports himself so as to wilfully injure or endanger the morals or health of
himself or others;
(18) Deports himself so as to wilfully injure or endanger the person or property
of himself or others.
18. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3213 (Burns 1956 Repl.). Transfer must be made even
where, e.g., the circuit court judge hearing the criminal case is also the juvenile court
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after a "full hearing," to waive its jurisdiction to a court of criminal
jurisdiction if the child is fifteen or older and is charged with a crime.'
Despite statutory silence, the Indiana courts have extended the right to a
change of judge and venue to delinquency,2" dependency, and neglect
cases.
2
1
Procedure
The means by which jurisdiction is obtained by the juvenile court
are two-fold: "(a) by petition praying that the person be adjudged
delinquent or dependent or neglected; [or by] (b) certification and trans-
fer from any other court before which any such person is brought charged
with the commission of a crime."22 The petition method of obtaining
jurisdiction is by far the primary one and forms the basic framework for
the work of the juvenile court and its probation department prior to the
actual adjudicatory hearing.
The provision setting out the petition method 2 states that infor-
mation regarding a delinquent child may be given to the court (practically
speaking, to the court's probation department) by any person, whereupon
the court is to make a "preliminary inquiry" to determine whether
"further action" should be taken, including, where practicable, an investi-
gation of the home and circumstances of the juvenile.2 4 If formal
jurisdiction is found to be appropriate, the court is to authorize a
petition2 5 to be filed and vertified by the probation officer.2" The petition
judge, and he intends to waive juvenile jurisdiction back to the circuit court. Hicks v.
State, -Ind. , 230 N.E.2d 757 (1967).
The exception to transfer for "capital" cases and the exclusion from the delinquency
definition of "crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment" constitute a formal
distinction presently without a difference; since the two provisions logically should be
congruent, the distinction is undoubtedly a quick of drafting, with potentialities for
trouble if capital punishment is abolished or a particular crime is made punishable only
by life imprisonment.
19. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3214 (Burns Supp. 1967). For a full discussion see the
accompanying Symposium article, Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jiarisdic-
tion: Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583 (1968).
20. State ex rel. McClintock v. Hamilton Cir. Ct, Ind.- , 232 N.E.2d
356 (1968) ; State ex rel. Duffy v. Lake Juv. Ct., 238 Ind. 404, 151 N.E.2d 293 (1958).
21. State ex rel. Dunn v. Lake Juv. Ct., - Ind. - , 228 N.E.2d 16 (1967);
State ex rel. Bryant v. Warrick Cir. Ct. 232 Ind. 655, 115 N.E.2d 742 (1953).
22. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3207 (Burns Supp. 1967).
23. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3208 (Burns Supp. 1967).
24. The necessity for "preliminary inquiry" has received from the courts a
reception ranging from cold to lukewarm. In Akers v. State, 114 Ind. App. 195, 51
N.E.2d 91 (1943), under the prior similar statute, the court opined in dicta that such
inquiry was entirely within the judge's discretion and thus not necessary, while in
Johnson v. State, 136 Ind. App. 528, 202 N.E.2d 895 (1964), the concurring opinion
disapprovingly noted the lack of any preliminary inquiry in the record. For the possible
application at this stage of the more mandatory investigation provision in the statute,
see note 31, infra.
25. Realistically, these steps taken prior to the filing of the peition are often left
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is to contain the facts constituting the delinquency, the name, age, and
residence of the juvenile, and the names and residence of his parents, if
known.
After a petition is filed, the court, unless the person voluntarily
appears, is to "issue a summons reciting briefly the substance of the
petition, and requiring the person.. . who have the custody or control of
the child to appear personally and bring the child before the court . . ."
and, if the parents do not have custody, they must be "notified of the
pendency of the case" by personal service.2" Service of the summons or
notice is to be made personally if practicable but, if not, service by
registered mail to the last known address of the person summoned or
notified is permissible; service is sufficient to confer jurisdiction if it is
made at least twenty-four hours before the time fixed for the summons'
return."
The delinquency hearing itself is in many respects conducted accord-
ing to the discretion of the judge: he may be informal, he may conduct
the hearing in chambers, he may include or exclude any person from the
hearing room, he may make the names of the parties and the offense a
public record, and he may order finger printing and photographing of a
juvenile fifteen or older.29 Non-discretionary provisions of the statute
direct that all juvenile cases are to be heard separately from any adult
trial, that the court is to hear juvenile cases without a jury, that the court
reporter is to be present to record rulings and oral testimony, and that a
probation officer is to be present "in the interest of the child."3 No
hearing is to be finally disposed of before a written prehearing investiga-
tion report" is considered by the judge, and either the judge or the
probation department may order a mental or physical examination of the
juvenile as part of the report."
to the probation department, with the judge actively participating only after the petition
is filed, although some judges do hold a full hearing before authorizing a petition.
Record entries of these steps are probably rare, if Johnson v. State, 136 Ind. App. 528,
202 N.E.2d 895 (1964), and Anton v. State, - Ind. App. , 224 N.E.2d 516
(1967), are any indication.
26. The necessity that the probation officer and no one else file the petition has
been much litigated in dependency and neglect proceedings. Hogg v. Peterson, 245
Ind. 515, 198 N.E.2d 767 (1964) ; Shupe v. Bell, 127 Ind. App. 292, 141 N.E.2d 351 (1957).
The culmination was a statutory amendment to IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3208 (Burns
Supp. 1967) in 1959 allowing the county welfare department to file a petition in such
proceedings. Except for these welfare department cases, the probation officer must sign
the petition. In re Rosenbarger, 127 Ind. App. 497, 153 N.E.2d 619 (1957).
27. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3209 (Burns 1956 Repl.). For further discussion of this
aspect, see text accompanying notes 48-55, infra.
28. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3210 (Bums 1956 Repl.).
29. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3113-3215 (Burns Supp. 1967).
30. Id.
31. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3113a (Bums Supp. 1967). This 1959 amendment is
generally veiwed as requiring a dispositional report analogous to the pre-commtment
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Following a determination of delinquency, the court may choose
among several dispositions of the juvenile: (1) placement on probation
or supervision, upon terms of the court's choosing, in the home or in
another's custody; (2) commitment to a public institution, 2 including
a mental hospital, or an approved private insitution or home; (3)
wardship in the court, public welfare agency, or child placement agency;
(4) postponement of judgment for two years, unless sooner requested by
the juvenile; and (5) further disposition deemed to be in the best
interests of the juvenile."
A determination of delinquency does not stamp a "criminal" label
on the case: a determination is deemed not to be a conviction, there are
no "civil disabilities" imposed, there is no civil service disqualification,
and the determination and evidence in the case cannot be used as evidence
against the juvenile in any other court.8" Expungement of all records is
provided after a two-year period if the court deems the juvenile to be
reformed. 5
Appeals from final orders or judgments of the juvenile court may be
taken "in the manner provided by law for appeals in criminal cases,""8
report in the criminal area, but the section's directive that "no hearing . . . shall be
finally disposed of" (emphasis added) can be read as requiring a separate report for
each hearing in a case, e.g., a report for a preliminary hearing, for a waiver hearing,
and for a detention hearing, as well as for the delinquency hearing itself.
32. The Boys' School and Girls' School in Indiana comprise virtually the only in-
stitutional alternatives to probation in the disposition of delinquents. These institutions
have been severely criticized in a recent survey report commissioned by the Indiana
Legislature's Department of Correction Study Committee, 2 National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, Corrections in Indiana (1967), abridged in 1 IND. LEGAL F.
33, 37-69 (1967), and they illustrate the view, frequently stated in Gaidt, that commit-
ment to a juvenile "training school" is often little different from commitment to an
adult prison. The resulting reluctance on the part of judges to use the Boys' and Girls'
Schools, coupled with the lack of less severe out-of-the-home alternatives, often
forces the judge merely to place on probation those juveniles who need more help than
the local probation department is equipped to give.
33. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3215 (Burns Supp. 1967). It is to be noted that all of
these dispositional choices including commitment are available once a determination of
delinquency is made. This broad discretion comports with the concept of individualized
treatment-dealing with what the juvenile is, not just with what he has done-but
collides with the criminal concept of equal punishment for equal crimes (which is itself
being modified by the growth of indeterminate sentences). Some states have provided a
rudimentary breakdown to allow the more drastic forms of treatment such as commit-
ment only if the act charged is one of the more serious forms of delinquency. See, e.g.,
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CoDE §§ 725-740 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-2
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); KAN. GEN. ANN. STAT. §§ 38-802-826 (1965).
34. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3215 (Burns Supp. 1967). In Noel v. State, - Ind.-,
215 N.E.2d 539 (1966), a prosecuting witness' juvenile record could not be used
to impeach the witness because the record was not "criminal."
35. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3215a (Burns Supp. 1967).
36. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3221 (Burns 1956 Repl.). This clause apparently refers
to the extent and manner of appeal rather than the court to which appeal should be
taken. See text accompanying notes 45-47, infra. The present appeal system contrasts
sharply with that of the prior statute. See note 79, infra.
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and the Indiana Appellate Court has exclusive jurisdiction of the appeal."
THE STANDARDS: GAULT AND BEYOND
The system described above must now be measured against the
standards enunciated in Gault. Under these standards, briefly stated, an
accused juvenile offender is entitled to notice of specific charges in time to
prepare adequately to meet them; the assistance of counsel, appointed if
necessary; confrontation by and cross-examination of the witnesses
against him; and the privilege against self-incrimination.
The sweeping nature and due process basis of the Gault decision
suggest that the Supreme Court may later extend other criminal law
standards to juvenile proceedings, such as the right to appellate review
and a transcript of the proceedings, the right to bar evidence gained from
unlawful search and seizure, the right to a criminal standard of proof, the
right to a public trial, and the right to a jury trial. Whether or not this
will happen depends, of course, upon an evaluation of both the precise
constitutional basis of a particular criminal standard and the suitability
of its application to the different demands of the juvenile process. Such
an evaluation will not be attempted here. Instead, this Note will attempt
to suggest the changes required in the Indiana law in order to make it
conform to Gadt as well as changes which would be necessary if these
other criminal standards were later extend to the juvenile process.
THE INDIANA SYSTEM AS MEASURED BY GAULT
Preliminarily, the basis upon which Indiana (and other states)
operated its juvenile system was attacked in Gault. In determining the
requirements of due process, the Supreme Court looked to the juris-
dictional underpinning of the juvenile court concept-the parens patriae
power of the state3 -- and found its legal credentials wanting.3" The
doctrine's debilitating effect on "fair treatment" was brought about by
using it as a justification for labeling juvenile proceedings "civil" rather
than "criminal" in nature, thus cutting the juvenile off from constitu-
tional and statutory protections afforded an otherwise similarly-situated
adult.' ° The care and treatment supposedly given the juvenile in a state
institution-the justification for this loss of protection-was found to be
little different from penal incarceration. 4
37. Adams v. State, 244 Ind. 460, 193 N.E.2d 362 (1963). The basis for the ruling
was the "non-penal" nature of juvenile proceedings.
38. "The sovereign power of guardianship over persons under a legal disability."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 1269 (4th ed. 1951).
39. 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
40. 387 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1967). See Note, Crimninal Offenders i; the Juvenile Cowrt:
More Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114 U. PENN. L. REv. 1171, 1176 (1966) ; Note,
In re Gault; Understanding the Attorney's New Role, 12 VmL. L. REv. 803, 808 (1967).
41. 387 U.S. 1, 18-30 (1967).
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The Indiana statute strongly reflects this parens patriae basis:
"[t] he purpose of this act is to secure ... care, guidance, and control...
as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by
his parents."42 Indiana cases have consistently based juvenile jurisdiction
on the parens patriae power,4" and have thus denominated the juvenile
process a "civil" proceeding." A clear example involves the question of
which court receives the appeal: while the statute directs that juvenile
appeals are to be taken "as in criminal cases"'45 and criminal appeals are
to be taken to the Indiana Supreme Court,46 decisions have, nonetheless,
directed juvenile appeals to the Indiana Appellate Court because juvenile
proceedings are "non-penal." 4
The standards themselves do not constitute a complete overturning
of the relevant portions of the Indiana juvenile court system; with the
exception of the privilege against self-incrimination, the Gadt holding
represents a tightening up of principles already recognized in at least a
crude form by the Indiana statutes and decisions.
Notice
Gault requires that notice be given to both the juvenile and his
parents "sufficiently in advance to prepare" for the hearing, and that the
notice "set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity."4 The
Indiana statute requires a summons, setting forth the "substance" of the
petition, to be issued upon the filing of the petition to the person having
custody of the juvenile (but not to the juvenile himself). If the parents do
not have custody, the statute requires only that "notification" of the
pendency of the hearing be sent to the parents.4" Service of summons or
notice may be made by registered mail to the last known address when
personal service is impracticable, and service must be effected at least
42. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3201 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
43. State ex re. Johnson v. White Cir. Ct., 225 Ind. 602, 608, 77 N.E.2d 298, 301(1948) ; Dinson v. Drosta, 39 Ind. App. 432, 434, 80 N.E. 32, 33 (1906).
44. Bd. of Children's Guardians v. Gioscio, 210 Ind. 581, 585, 4 N.E.2d 199, 201
(1936). Conversely, "[tlhe constitutional rights of a person charged with crime are not[the juvenile's]" and "[piroceedings against him in juvenile court are in no sense
criminal." Akers v. State, 114 Ind. App. 195, 203, 51 N.E.2d 91, 94 (1943).
There has not been, however, total procedural surrender: "[jiuvenile court
procedure has not been so far socialized and individual rights so far diminished that a
child ... may be placed in an institution simply because some court might think that
to be in the best interests of the state." In re Coyle, 122 Ind. App. 217, 219, 101 N.E.2d
192, 193 (1951) (uncorrected variance between petition and proof).
45. IN'D. ANN. STAT. § 9-3221 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
46. IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-214 (Burns Supp. 1967).
47. Adams v. State, 244 Ind. 460, 462, 193 N.E2d 362 (1963) ; It re Rosenbarger,
127 Ind. App. 497, 141 N.E.2d 853 (1957) ; State ex rel. Miller v. Gannon, 117 Ind. App.
677, 75 N.E.2d 678 (1947).
48. 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
49. IN . ANN. STAT. § 9-3209 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
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twenty-four hours before the return date." Cases, where notice to the
parents was admittedly not issued, would seem to indicate that notice is a
jurisdictional requirement." However, this "jurisdictional requirement"
has been deemed satisfied where the record did not affirmatively disclose
a lack of it."
No cases construe the provision requiring that the "substance" of the
petition be noted on the summons. In one case, however, the court
overturned a determination of delinquency because the juvenile was not
apprised of the charges even during the hearing."
While the Indiana system thus provides for a basic type of notice,
such notice as is required does not "set forth the misconduct with
particularity" nor does the twenty-four hour service provision realistically
assure notice "sufficiently in advance to prepare." While judicial inter-
pretation can provide a short-term solution, 4 it is clear that statutory
amendment is needed, providing for separate notice to the juvenile,"5
particularity as to misconduct charged, and a longer interval between
service and return of summons.
Counsel
Gault held that the juvenile and his parents must be advised of their
right to the assistance of counsel, and to appointment of counsel if
indigent, where the hearing may result in commitment to an institution.,56
The Indiana statute is silent as to counsel. However, while a juvenile
hearing has often been termed an "adversary" hearing, 7 lack of advice
of the right to counsel has been denied the status of a constitutional defect
in a habeas corpus ,proceeding." In addition, an older case, using the
"civil" rubric, stated in dicta that the right to counsel was not
applicable. 9
50. Im. ANN. STAT. § 9-3210 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
51. Johnson v. State, 136 Ind. App. 528, 202 N.E.2d 895 (1964); Ford v. State,
122 Ind. App. 315, 104 N.E.2d 406 (1952).
52. Harris v. Souder, 233 Ind. 287, 119 N.E.2d 8 (1954).
53. Green v. State, 123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647 (1953) (voluntary appearance
by the jvuenile and his father prevented the question of summons from arising).
54. It is not particularly difficult to construe the statute's "substance of the
petition" to mean Gault's "particular misconduct charged ;" it is more difficult, however,
judicially to require longer than 24-hours notice or separate notice to the juvenile, when
the statute goes so clearly the other way.
55. This is particularly important when the juvenile and his parents take conflict-
ing positions with respect to the case.
56. 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967). Since commitment is possible no matter what definition
of delinquency the juvenile's conduct falls under, see note 33, supra, the commitment
proviso of the holding in Gault makes no difference in Indiana-the right to counsel
applies to every delinquency case.
57. State cx rel. Duffy v. Lake Juv. Ct., 238 Ind. 404, 407, 151 N.E.2d 293, 295
(1958) ; In ,re Coyle, 122 Ind. App. 217, 220, 101 N.E.2d 192, 193 (1951).
58. Lehman v. Montgomery, 233 Ind. 393, 120 N.E.2d 172 (1954).
59. Akers v. State, 114 Ind. App. 195, 205, 51 N.E.2d 91, 95 (1943).
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The right to counsel has historically been a court-generated right, so
a statutory change to meet Gault is not strictly necessary. But two con-
siderations make statutory amendment desirable. First, the Gault holding
is expressly confined to the "adjudicative" phase of the juvenile process.
Thus, a restrictive interpretation of Gault would require advising the
juvenile of his right to counsel only when he steps before the judge at the
"adjudicative" hearing. A statute, however, should require advising the
juvenile of his right at least at the petition-filing stage, and preferably at
time of detention.6" Second, the expanded role of appointed counsel under
the Gault regime suggests that serious burdens may be placed upon
attorneys asked to serve in counties making uncompensated appointments.
A statutory scheme providing a flexible schedule of fees and expenses
payable from both state and local funds might be needed to implement
effectively the right to competent counsel.6
Confrontation and Cross-eaamination
Gault held that, absent a valid confession, confrontation with and
sworn testimony from witnesses available for cross-examination are
necessary for a determination of delinquency and commitment to a state
institution." The ruling does not, however, unequivocally delineate the
scope of the requirement of confrontation and cross-examination. Thus,
it is not clear whether the requirement is merely that some evidence must
be from a confronted witness available for cross-examination or that all
evidence, aside from recognized hearsay exceptions, must be of such a
character.63
The Indiana decisions make it clear that some evidence subject to
60. Advice of the right to counsel is needed at the detention stage not only to
provide time to prepare (this requirement is probably satisfied by advice at the
petition-filing stage) but also to provide a salutary control over detention itself. Since
the parents should be notified of the juvenile's detention in any case, the notification
(which does not replace the "notice" required by Gault) should also advise the parents
of the right to counsel.
61. Experience under the Gault standard is needed before adopting any such
scheme. Juveniles may still decline counsel in large numbers, and the resources of the
bar may increase because of the new emphasis on criminal representation.
For a survey of the use and compensation of indigent counsel in Indiana, see the
Indiana section of 2 L. SILERSTEin, DEFENSE OF THE POOR (1965).
62. 387 U.S. 1, 57 (1967).
63. These alternatives represent the extremes. A further breakdown can be made,
for example, between requiring evidence of such character only as to some elements of
the delinquency or requiring it as to all elements, or at the other end of the spectrum,
between using civil rules of admission of hearsay or criminal rules.
The Supreme Court's ultimate position in this regard is hinted at when the opinion
cites CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELF., STANDARDS FOR
JUVENILE AND FAMIiLY COURTS (1966), as being "in general accord with our conclusions.
They state that testimony should be under oath and that only competent, material and
relevant evidence undeor rules applicable to cihil cases should be admitted in evidence."
387 U.S. 1, 56 (1967) (emphasis added).
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cross-examination must be presented at the adjudicative hearing,"4 so tc
that extent Indiana practice conforms to Gault. However, if Gault is taken
to require that all evidence be non-hearsay (aside from recognized
exceptions, whether under civil or criminal rules), then Indiana's con-
formity is questionable. The problem lies in the statutory and decisional
treatment of the major item of hearsay in any juvenile case, the probation
officer's report. 5 On the one hand, the statute and cases prohibit
receiving as evidence any information gained by the probation depart-
ment"8 but, on the other hand, a 1959 amendment requires that a
"written prehearing investigation report" be presented to and considered
by the judge before any hearing is completed. 7 Since the statutes lack
any mandatory provision for separating the adjudicative and dispositional
phases of the hearing, this apparently means that, while the hearsay
contained in the report cannot form part of the evidence considered by
the judge, it must be considered by him nonetheless, in some unspecified
guise, before final adjudication.
Thus, in order to bring Indiana into conformity with a rule which
requires that all evidence be subject to cross-examination aside from the
hearsay exceptions, a judicial decision is not enough; it is necessary
either to repeal the prehearing investigation report provision or to amend
it to provide that the report will not be introduced until after adjudica-
tion.8
Self-incrimination
Gault held that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to
64. In Green v. State, 123 Ind. App. 81, 86, 108 N.E.2d 647, 650 (1953), the court
reversed a juvenile case in which the only evidence was the ex parte report of the
probation officer, saying, "the [juvenile] act does not . . . sanction the action of a
court in finding a juvenile guilty of a wrong against the state in disregard of his
rights to a hearing in which he is apprised of the charges against him and the evidence
in support thereof and afforded an opportunity to defend himself." Accord, Ford v.
State, 122 Ind. App. 315, 104 N.E.2d 406 (1952).
65. The mental or physical examination report contemplated under IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 9-3220 (Burns 1956 Repl.) shares the same problem with the probation officer's
report, but no case has ruled on such a report.
No statute or decision in Indiana touches upon other hearsay, such as what the in-
vestigating police officer heard, so that the local juvenile judge is left to his dis-
cretion in admitting such testimony.
66. IN . ANN. STAT. § 9-3119 (Burns 1956 Repl.); Groves v. Smith, 127 Ind.
App. 109, 138 N.E.2d 295 (1956) ; Ford v. State, 122 Ind. App. 315, 104 N.E.2d 406
(1952) ; Kessler v. Williston, 117 Ind. App. 690, 75 N.E.2d 676 (1947).
67. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3113a (Bums Supp. 1967).
68. The report is necessary for proper disposition, and similar information is also
necessary at the pre-adjudicative phases of the process (authorization to file a petition,
detention hearings, etc.) where the emphasis, unlike the adjudicative phase, is on what
the offender is, not what he has done. Such procedural niceties are best handled by
legislation.
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juveniles as well as adults. 9 The opinion does not outline the exact
extent of the privilege, but it is clear that the privilege not only requires
that the juvenile be warned of his right to keep silent at the hearing, but
also prohibits the introduction of an admission or confession made prior
to the hearing unless it was made "voluntarily"; this the opinion describes
as ". . . not coerced or suggested .... [nor] the product of ignorance of
rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair."7 The inclusion of
"ignorance of rights" as one of the tests of voluntariness would seem to
call forth the rules laid down in Miranda v. Arizona, 71 but no mention is
made of them in the holding.
One difficulty in determining the extent of the applicability of the
privilege is the oft-repeated statement in Gault that the decision is con-
fined to the adjudicative phase of the juvenile process."' If the Supreme
Court did not mean to incorporate the Miranda rules into the juvenile
process, it is difficult to discern just what official conduct, less meticulous
than what Miranda requires, would satisfy the Court. To compound the
difficulty, waiver standards more stringent than are necessary for adults
may be required to protect a juvenile due to his lessened understanding.7
The result, both for the state and the juvenile's counsel, is a sea without
safe harbor-no one can tell with any assurance what constitutes a valid
waiver."
The Indiana scheme is clearly inadequate in its treatment of the
privilege, 5 but the lack of guidelines in Gault frustrates any compre-
hensive statutory attempt to provide "safe" procedures with regard to
69. 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
70. Id.
71. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
72. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was similarly confined within the
criminal process in the sesne that it only prohibited the iuse in a trial of a confession
obtained in violation of the rules it set down; perhaps that is all the Supreme Court
meant in limiting its decision in Gault.
73. The majority in Gault "appreciate that special problems may arise with respect
to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf of children, and that there may well be some
differences in technique-but not in principle-depending upon the age of the child and
the presence and competence of parents." 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). Having thus tantalized
the reader, the Court, like a good law professor, leaves its students to speculate on
what these different techniques might be.
74. The impact of this stringency and uncertainty in juvenile proceedings should
be even greater than that of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in the criminal area, since the vast majority of juvenile
cases are decided to some extent on the basis of confessions. Note, In -re Gault:
Understanding the Attorney's New Role, 12 VILL. L. REv. 803, 816 (1967).
A recent case illustrates what the Illinois Supreme Court, at least, considers a valid
waiver under Gaidt. In re Orr, - Ill. -, 231 N.E.2d 424 (1967).
75. The statute is mute on the subject, and cases considering a confession have
held it valid (as the only evidence in the case), Akers v. State, 114 Ind. App. 195, 51
N.E.2d 91 (1943), or have declined to rule on a confession admitted over objection
because the evidence was insufficient even with it (the juvenile confessed to an act
different from that charged). In re Coyle, 122 Ind. App. 217, 101 N.E.2d 192 (1951).
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the privilege and its waiver. Much, however, can be done in terms of
requiring early notification to parents, written waiver forms in simple
language, non-intimidating surroundings, and the like, to provide some
of the more elementary safeguards.
BEYOND GAULT
Appellate Review and Transcript
Gault explicitly did not rule on the right to appellate review and
the right to a transcript of the proceedings." The opinion did comment,
however, upon the utility of appellate review as opposed to habeas
corpus proceedings and a transcript as opposed to subpoenaing the juvenile
judge to testify. Thus, it dearly indicates what the Supreme Court, if
not yet the Constitution, considers desirable procedure."
The Indiana statute gives the juvenile the right to appeal a final
order or judgment of the juvenile court and decisions have directed these
appeals to the Indiana Appellate Court.7 ' The scope of this review is the
same as in criminal cases and the appeal procedure is subject to the same
rules. 7
While the bare right to appellate review is thus provided, the
effective assertion of that right depends upon the completeness of the
record before the appellate court. The Indiana scheme gives the juvenile
the right to a "record" of the proceedings," but it is not clear what this
"record" is to include.8 That this may, in practice, mean merely the
order book entries rather than a stenographic transcript of the case is
suggested by Sheridan v. State,82 in which it was held that the right to
such a transcript was dependent upon the juvenile's request prior to the
hearing that one be made, despite the mandatory wording of the statute
to the contrary.8
To permit meaningful review, all that is necessary is that Sheridan
76. 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967). Another reason doubtlessly was that no case had yet
held that the Constitution requires a state to provide a right to appellate review.
77. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966).
78. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3221 (Burns 1956 Repl.). For a decision, see note 37,
sup ra.
79. This contrasts with the appeal procedure of the superseded statute, Ind. Acts
1941, ch. 233, § 30, in which only review of the sufficiency of facts to support the charge
and sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of facts was allowed, with a
special bill of particulars to be prepared by the judge constituting the record on review.
See Akers v. State, 114 Ind. App. 195, 51 N.E.2d 91 (1943).
80. State ex rel. Fritz v. Delaware Cir. Ct., 236 Ind. 229, 139 N.E.2d 442 (1957).
81. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3114 (Burns 1956 Repl.) provides merely that the "court
shall maintain records of all cases brought before it"
82. 125 Ind. App. 271, 124 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
83. Im. ANN. STAT. § 9-3215 (Burns Supp. 1967): "The official court reporter
shall be present in court and take down in shorthand the oral evidence given in all
cases and note all rulings of the judge in respect to said cause."
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be overruled, since the provision requiring the presence of a court
reporter is adequate (apart from its anachronistic insistence on short-
hand). A free transcript for indigents can be required, as in the criminal
area, by judicial decision.
Search and Seizure
The right to bar evidence gained from unlawful search and seizure
was not considered in Gault. If the right to bar such evidence were
applied to the Indiana scheme,8" the problem would arise of keeping the
evidence away from the trier of the fact (the juvenile judge at the
adjudicative hearing), since the juvenile, unlike the adult, cannot avoid
the bias of the judge, who has seen the illegal evidence when passing on
its admissibility, by asking for' a jury trial.85 One solution might be
to require the judge to rule on disputed evidence at a preliminary hearing
(perhaps the hearing in which the authorization to file a petition is
given) and then to appoint a referee to sit at the adjudicative hearing.
This could be cumbersome, but full protection for the juvenile requires a
rule of like tenor.
Criminal Standard of Proof
While Gault has been interpreted as not requiring a criminal
standard of proof in juvenile cases,8" the conceptual similarity between
Gault's more stringent rules on evidence' and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is sufficiently close to leave the question open. Neither the Indiana
statute nor decisions specify the standard of proof applicable to the
Indiana scheme, but the "civil" rubric" and the wide discretion given the
juvenile judge indicate that the "preponderance of evidence" or, perhaps,
"clear and convincing evidence" standard is used. Since the question of
the proper standard is difficult to raise on appeal (because there is no
jury to instruct), the preferable mode of change is through the legislature.
Public Trial
Closing the hearing to the public has always been one of the key-
stones of the juvenile philosophy, reflecting the desire that the jvenile
not be stigmatized by his involvement with the court; the Indiana statute
accordingly gives the juvenile judge complete discretion to exclude"
84. No statutory provisions or cases deal with the issue in a juvenile context.
85. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3215 (Bums Supp. 1967) prohibits a jury trial in
juvenile cases.
86. In re Wylie, 231 A.2d 81 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1967).
87. See text accompanying notes 62-68, supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 38-47, supra.
89. IN. ANN. STAT. 9-3113 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
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or let in"° anyone he wishes.
If a public trial were to be required in juvenile cases, this discretion
would need to be removed by repeal. Since the hearing would then be
public in all cases, other provisions which attempt to screen the juvenile
from publicity would logically fall as well.9
Jury Trial
The right to a jury trial, where available to juveniles, is rarely
used, 2 due to a desire to keep the proceedings confidential.9 3 An earlier
Indiana statute granted the juvenile the right to a jury trial 4 but even
then the necessity, already established in criminal cases, of advising the
accused of the right was not extended to juveniles.9 The present Indiana
statute prohibits use of a jury."8 If the right to a jury trial were extended
to juveniles, the statute would need to be changed. The right to be advised
of the option could be extended by decision, although an exercised right
to counsel would make such advice less necessary.
CONCLUSION
The changes in the Indiana juvenile court system necessary to con-
form to the standards set forth in Gault involve both legislative and
judicial action. One approach would be for the legislature to make as few
revisions as possible, thereby thrusting onto the courts, through inter-
pretation, the major burden of conforming the law to Gault. But the
courts, unlike the legislature, must work within the existing statute and
would thus lose some flexibility in shaping rational and integrated pro-
cedures. For this reason, if for no other, a more expansive and inter-
dependent legislative program is preferable to an approach stressing the
minimum change needed in isolated sections.
Such a program, for example, could include the various types of
warnings and notification in one comprehensive procedure covering the
different levels of contact that the juvenile has with the system. Thus if a
juvenile were detained, notification of his parents would include advice of
the right to counsel, while the juvenile would receive advice of both his
right to counsel and his right to keep silent. Notification of specific
90. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3215 (Bums Supp. 1967).
91. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3215 (public record, fingerprints and photographs, use
of record in another trial), and § 9-3114 (public record) (Bums Supp. 1967).
92. Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized
Justice, 79 HARv. L. REv. 775, 793 (1966).
93. Note, Crbinal Offenders in Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and Anwther
Proposal, 114 U. PENN. L. REv. 1171, 1186 n.77 (1966).
94. Ind. Acts 1941, ch. 233, § 13.
95. Akers v. State, 114 Ind. App. 195, 51 N.E.2d 91 (1943).
96. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3215 (Burns Supp. 1967).
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charges would await the petition. If he were not detained, the summons
(to the juvenile and his parents) would be served so that there was
adequate time to prepare a defense before its return date and would
contain all warnings and a notice of the specific charges.
In regard to the evidentiary problems arising from the confrontation
standard, the hearsay report of the probation officer would be controlled
in its submission to the judge by splitting the hearing into its adjudicative
and dispositional phases. Other hearsay would be left to the courts to
control under civil rules.
By enacting this sort of comprehensive program, the legislature
would more adequately meet the Superme Court's challenge in Gault to
give the juvenile fair treatment in actuality, consistent with the state's
espousal of concern for its children.
Kent H. Westley
